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CONDUCT OF JUDGES AND LAWYERS
ORIE L. PHILLIPS
Chief Judge, U. S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit

It will be my purpose in this paper to deal rather broadly
with the subject of professional and judicial ethics.
In an approach to this subject, it seems to me certain fundamental concepts should be kept in mind.
First, the lawyer is a member of a learned profession, not a
mere tradesman. Persons admitted to practice law in a state are
a part of the judicial system of such state and officers of its courts.
Likewise, persons admitted to practice in the Federal courts are a
part of the Federal judicial system and officers of the Federal
courts.
We cannot talk about a profession without considering the
ideals which distinguished it from a vocation:
* * * If there is such a thing as a profession as a
concept distinct from a vocation, it must consist in the
ideal which its members maintain, the dignity of character which they bring to the performance of their duties
and the austerity of the self-imposed ethical standards.1
Judge Carter in his book, "The Ethics of the Legal Profession"
said:
And if [the law] is thus set apart as a profession,
it must have traditions and tenets of its own, which are
to be mastered and lived up to. This living spirit of the
profession, which limits yet uplifts it as a livelihood,
has been customarily known by the vague term "legal
ethics." There is much more to it than rules of ethics.
There is a whole atmosphere of life's behavior. What is
signified is all the learning about the traditions of behavior that mark off and emphasize the legal profession
as a guild of public officers. And the apprentice must hope
and expect to make full acquaintance with this body of
traditions, as his manual of equipment, without which
he cannot do his part to keep the law on the level of a
profession.
Second, when a lawyer becomes a judge, there devolves upon
him duties with respect to his official conduct which concern his
relation to the state and the people, to litigants who come before
him, the practitioners of law in his court, to the witnesses, jurors
and attendants who aid him in the administration of justice, and
to the principles of law that condition his decisions. Moreover,
there devolves upon him obligations of personal private conduct to
the end that he shall not bring reproach upon the high office which
he occupies.
IW.

A. Shumaker, in Law Notes, Vol. 28, No. 6.
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Sir Matthew Hale in his "History of the Common Law" setting forth "things necessary to be had in remembrance" by a
judge said:
That, in the administration of justice, I am entrusted
for God, the king and country; therefore, that it must be
done uprightly, deliberately, resolutely.
And Mr. Justice Roberts in his address to the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York in December, 1948, said:
When a man goes on the Court, he ought not to have
to depend upon the strength and robustness of his own
character to resist the temptation to shade a view in order
to put an umbrella up in case it should rain. He ought to
be free to say his say, knowing, as the founding fathers
meant he should know, that nothing could reach him and
that his conscience was as free as could be * * * He
ought not to have to make a vow to himself that ambition
shall not color his opinions. It should be impossible for
that to happen.
Legal ethics has been defined as "that branch of moral science
which treats of the duties which a member of the legal profession
owes to the public,
to the court, to his professional brethren, and
'2
to his client."
The Code of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association was adopted in 1908, in response to an urgent demand for a
definite statement of professional standards.
The Canons of Judicial Ethics were adopted by the American
Bar Association in 1924 as a proper guide and reminder for judges
and as indicating what the people have a right to expect from them.
The standards of professional and judicial conduct set forth
in the codes of professional and judicial ethics and in the decisions
of the courts are high. But, I am convinced they can and should
be improved and expanded. Competence, integrity, loyalty and
public duty cannot be over-emphasized.
Sir Norman Birkett, the distinguished English jurist, in a
speech to the Lawyers Club of Toronto said:
You will forgive me saying it, but I am jealous of
the very great reputation of the law. Its future is in our
hands and it is a solemn responsibility and duty cast upon
every member of the practicing profession that in all he
does, in his duty to the client, in his duty to the court and
in his duty to the State, he shall be above and beyond all
other things a man of complete integrity. Whatever gifts
or attributes he may possess, he shall have this supreme
qualification, that he is a man of integrity and a man of
honor.
"-Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Rawle's 3d Revision.
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Some persons are endowed with a keen sense of right and
wrong and are able to attain a true perception of morals and ethics
and to develop a real desire to attain the ideal ends of human
action. Others are amoral and totally lack a sense of moral responsibility. Still others are immoral; they lack the strength of
character to adhere to what they know to be right. Individuals
falling within these latter two groups should never be permitted
to practice law.
It should be kept in mind that the right to practice law may
and should be conditioned upon certain qualifications for the protection of the public, and that a license to practice law confers no
vested right, but rather, a conditional license, revocable for cause,
to the end that the public and the profession shall be protected.
If the ability to attain a true perception of morals, ethics, integrity and honor is a proper qualification for admission to the
Bar, then there arises a peculiar problem with respect to time.
Shall we wait until a young man or women has spent a minimum
of three years in college and three years in an approved law school
-and then investigate and find out that he is amoral or immoral
and deny him admission to the Bar? Or shall we endeavor to
ascertain such facts before we permit him to enter upon the study
of law?
In some states a character inquiry is made when the applicant
applies to take the Bar Examinations; in others after he has taken
the Bar Examinations, but before he is granted his license.
In the third group of states a finding of good character, or
at least a character investigation, is required when the prospective
applicant commences the study of law. This group includes Alabama, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey,
North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas and Vermont.
The Pennsylvania system requires registration with a preceptor approved by a County Board. To quote the rule on the
preceptor's duties: "Each preceptor shall require students registered with him * * * to keep in touch with him from time to
time by correspondence or otherwise, and shall help them- to understand the ethics, duties, responsibilities and temptations of the
profession. He shall endeavor to develop in each student a high
standard of character, and, upon completion of the student's law
course, shall certify to the Board what he knows of his fitness and
general qualifications (other than scholastic) to become a-creditable
member of the Bar." The Board also makes an investigation and
approves or disapproves the applicant's registration as a law
student and reports its conclusions to a State Board. While the
applicant may seek a review of an adverse decision at this stage,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has said that it is not "compelled to allow an appeal from the action taken by the State Board";
that "the decision of a County Board in the matter of the registration of a law student is conclusive in the absence of fraud or mistake"; and that "This court has never compelled a County Board
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to register a law student." A further investigation is made when
the student completes his studies, following a required published
notice of the applicant's intention to take the Bar Examination.
Finally, before his admission to practice, the student must serve
a six months clerkship in the office of his preceptor. The purpose
of this clerkship is to give the applicant a practical idea of the
way in which problems of court and office are dealt with and at
'the same time a conception of the proper standards of professional
conduct which daily contact with a reputable older lawyer should
confer.
Such a procedure seems to me to be well calculated in a large
measure to prevent persons lacking the essential attributes of
character to engage in the practice of law from entering law
schools, and certainly it provides the admitting authority with reliable information from which to determine whether or not an applicant for admission to the Bar possesses the requisite attributes
of moral character.
An experience of 13 years as a member of the Committee on
Professional Ethics and Grievances of the American Bar Association, five of which I served as chairman, and the studies I have
made in this field in connection with the Survey of the Legal
Profession, lead me to the conclusion that if we are to attain our
goals we must have a sound inculcation in our law schools of the
duties and obligations which devolve upon a lawyer and of the
professional standards to which he should adhere. I do not mean
by this a mere teaching of the abstract standards defined in the
Canons of Ethics. It should be a much broader course, emphasizing
the lawyer's responsibility to his client, to his profession, to the
courts, and to the public-the responsibilities which devolve upon
a lawyer upon becoming a member of the legal profession. A fallacy held by many is that all a lawyer needs to know to answer
any question in legal ethics is the difference between right and
wrong, or simple honesty. His knowledge of ethical standards
should be much broader than that. What seem to me to be two
ideal courses are those given at the Southern Methodist University
School of Law and the College of Law of the University of Illinois,
where emphasis is placed on the history and the traditions of the
profession and where instruction is provided with respect to the
responsibilities of the lawyer in his various relationships, in the
duties he .owes to his clients, to the court, to his fellow lawyers
and to the public. May I recommend to you for consideration
the Survey of the Legal Profession Report of Elliott E. Cheatham
on "The Inculcation of Professional Standards and the Functions
of the Lawyer," published in the Tennessee Law Review, June,
1951, and particularly that part of it dealing with the two courses
I have mentioned.
So far, I have undertaken to deal with the problem before admission to the Bar. May I now deal briefly with post-admission
problems. No doubt, from time to time persons will obtain ad-
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mission to practice law who lack the essential attributes of moral
character and integrity and who will be guilty of unprofessional
conduct.
The issuance to a person of a license to practice law confers no
vested right, but rather a conditional license revocable for cause,
to the end that the public shall be protected.
Some infractions of professional standards may be dealt with
properly by reprimand, public or private. More serious infractions
must be dealt with by revocation of the license to practice law. It
is my firm conviction that a revocation of a license should not be
for a stated period and should place on the person whose license
has been revoked the burden of establishing by clear and satisfactory proof that he possesses the qualifications for readmission,
which should not be less than those required for original admission. No one can forcast with reasonable certainty when, if
ever, a person guilty of conduct warranting revocation of his
license will be rehabilitated and will possess the qualifications essential to admission to practice law.
One of the glaring weaknesses in our disciplinary practices
is the use of suspensions for limited periods and reinstatement
without adequate proof that the lawyer seeking readmission
possesses the requisite attributes of character and integrity. We
have the unseemly spectacle of lawyers being reinstated, who
have been guilty of conduct which would be a bar to original admission.
In 1936, the late Justice Nathan Conrey, of the Supreme Court
of California, wrote in an opinion of that court resulting in the
disbarment of a lawyer found guilty of fraud and decption:
The license to practice as an attorney and counselor
is a certificate of good moral character. It is a representation by the court, speaking as of the date of the license,
that the licensee is a trustworthy person who reasonably may be expected to act fairly and honestly in the
practice of his profession. Thereafter, in the absence of
proof to the contrary, the original representation exists
as a continuing presumption. * * * But when charges
of misconduct have been made and proved in a disbarment proceeding, the original representation has fallen,
and with it the presumption becomes dust and ashes.
There are, as everyone knows, many lapses from high
standards, due to human frailty, which may be overlooked
or visited with mild punishment * * *
But when in a disbarment proceeding it is established
by evidence amounting to proof, that an attorney and
counselor had been dishonest in dealing with the affairs
of his client; and has violated the duty which he owes to
"never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer
by an artifice or false statement of fact or law" * * *
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then a refusal to order disbarment amounts to a renewal
of the original license, and is a declaration that in spite
of his own record, the attorney is fit to be offered to the
public as one who safely may be trusted. In this case
the court has no reasonable alternative. The petitioner
has disbarred himself.
There is one error in the statement just quoted, an error
which pervades the decisions in too many disciplinary cases and too
often limits the thinking of those responsible for the task of professional housecleaning. That error lies in the use of the word
"punishment" with reference to the suspension or disbarment of
a lawyer. It is axiomatic that neither the discipline of a lawyer
nor his disbarment is "punishment." The cases are legion which
hold that the purpose of discipline is to preserve the courts "from
the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them." From
this it follows as a natural consequence that it is equally the purpose of discipline or disbarment to protect the public and the legal
profession from the ministration of those same unfit persons. As
said in a fairly recent case:
In the final analysis the purpose of any disbarment
proceeding is not to punish the attorney-in the case of
a criminal act he is amenable to punishment under
the penal statutes-but is to afford protection to the public and to the profession by an investigation respecting
the moral fitness of the attorney to continue in the practice
of the law.
Nor should any one ever doubt the power of the courts, when
gifted with courage as most courts are, to make adequate inquiry
into the conduct of lawyers as officers of the courts, and to compel lawyers to testify under oath in such inquiries, even though
disciplinary proceedings against such lawyers may be the result.
The late Justice Cardozo dispelled any doubt on this score
when
sitting as a member of the New York Court of Appeals. 3
The power to investigate and to control the membership of
the Bar through disciplinary proceedings is as old as the profession itself. It is co-equal with the power to regulate admissions to
the practice of law, and includes the power to determine the good
character and fitness of all who seek admission or readmission to
practice. Unless this power is fully recognized and fully exercised
by the courts, with the support and assistance of the organized
Bar, we may as well cease to think of ourselves as a learned profession.
JUDICIAL CONDUCT
The perpetuity of American institutions and the preservation of individual freedom and ordered liberty under law depend
in a large measure upon the maintenance of judicial establishPeople ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N. Y. 465, 162 N. E. 487, 60 ALR 851.
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ments presided over by judges who are able, conscientious, fearless, honest, competent and just. A judge should be learned in the
law and learned in the ways of men; he should stand firmly for
truth and virtue and uncompromisingly against falsehood and
wrong; he should be patient when patience is required, but swift
when dispatch is possible; he should be insensible to the attack
of the demagogue and the blandishments of the flatterer. He should
strive always to square his official actions with the dictates of his
own conscience and his own concepts of even-handed justice. To
the arrogant he should be adamant, to the timid reassuring, and
to the ignorant merciful. He should never shirk a duty, no matter
how unpleasant, distasteful, or charged with unpopularity. He
should never usurp-power, but neither should he fail to exercise
it when it exists ind the occasion demands its exercise.
How may we hope to have a judiciary that measures up to
those high standards? My answer is threefold: First, an improved method of judicial selection; second, an integrated judicial
system, with an administrative director under judicial supervision;
and third, adequate judicial salaries and retirement benefits.
I think is necessary that we remove as far as possible political considerations in the selection of judges and select them
on the basis of legal learning, judicial temperament and integrity.
Selection by the chief executive, with the advice and consent
of the Senate, works well when the executive weighs recommendations of the organized Bar and advisors like the Attorney General, makes political considerations secondary, and bases his selection on attributes and qualifications essential to a high order of
judicial service.
In my opinion, the elective system is the least desirable, because it is impossible, in my judgment, to remove judicial elections
from partisan politics.
The so-called Missouri Plan was approved by the American
Bar Association in 1937. It was adopted in Missouri in 1940, by
an initiative petition. The legislature resubmitted it in 1942 and
it was retained by double the majority it received on the first submission. It was made a part of the 1945 Missouri constitution
without change, except more judicial offices were embraced within
it. Under the Missouri Plan selection is made by appointment of
the Governor from a list of three names submitted to him by a
selection commission. The selection commission for the appellate
courts, the supreme court and three courts of appeals, is composed
of the chief justice, three lawyers selected by the Bar, which is
an integrated Bar, and three laymen appointed by the Governor.
The six members, other than the chief justice, have six-year terms,
staggered so that one term expires at the end of each year and the
members are not eligible to succeed themselves. The lay members
are appointed by the Governor-one every two years-each from
a different court of appeals district. The lawyer members are
elected one every two years by the members of the Bar of the
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court of appeals district which they represent. The selection commissions for the city trial courts have five members. They are
the presiding judge of the court of appeals of the district in which
the city is located, who serves as chairman, two laymen appointed
by the Governor and two lawyers, elected by the Bar. Their terms
are also for six years and are staggered so that the term of each
member expires in a different year.
After a judge so appointed has served one year, the people
vote at the next general election, following such year of service,
upon the question of whether or not this judge shall have a full
regular term. (Trial courts, six years; appellate courts, twelve
years.) Thereafter, a judge given a full term must, at the expiration of each term, submit his declaration of-desire for another
term to be voted on by the people. At such elections, the judges'
names are placed on a separate judicial ballot, without party designation, the only question submitted being: "Shall Judge ---------------of the -----------Court, be retained in office? Yes. No." Judges are
prohibited from making any contribution to or holding any office
in a political party or organization or taking part in any political
campaign. Thus, political opposition is eliminated and the judge
runs solely on his record of service on the bench. Unless that record
is corrupt or obviously inefficient, there is every reason to expect
that he would receive a favorable vote.
Honorable Laurance Hyde, Judge of the Supreme Court of
Missouri, has said this with respect to the results of the Plan:
Our ten years experience with this plan has demonstrated its effectiveness to bring about a gradual and continuing improvement of the judiciary. It has taken our
courts out of politics. Our political parties have respected
it and have -made no effort to influence elections under it.
Judicial qualities have been substituted for party affiliations as the principal basis for selecting and retaining
judges. Court dockets have been brought up to date, delays lessened and expense of litigation reduced because
judges spend no time campaigning for reelection but are
free to use all their time on their court work. Our judges
can now always be working on the next case instead of
on the next election. All this has increased the confidence of our people in the courts and raised the prestige
of the Missouri judiciary throughout the nation. In at
least half the states, Bar and Citizens Committees are
working for the adoption of similar plans.
I am of the opinion that a plan substantially like the Missouri
Plan is the solution for the selection of state judges.
An integrated and coordinated judicial system under which
judicial manpower can be assigned and used wherever the need
exists, to the end that all of the court dockets of the state shall be
kept current, is, in my opinion, essential.
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Experience under the Federal system and in New Jersey and
other jurisdictions has demonstrated that an administrative director for the courts, under proper judicial supervision, contributes
valuable help to proper judicial administration.
The number of lawyers who fail to live up to the high standards of the profession are comparatively few. The number of
judges who fail to meet the high standards of judicial conduct are
likewise comparatively few. But the shortcomings of these few
injure the public and tend to destroy confidence in our courts
and greatly lower the esteem in which the public holds our profession.
Ours is a learned profession and not a mere trade. Competence, integrity, loyalty, and public duty cannot be over-emphasized. Skilled and adequate professional legal service should
be made available to all segments of our society.. It should not be
denied to lower-income bracket persons or to the indigent because
of cost. The quality of judicial service should be improved by better methods of judicial selection and the complete removal of
judges from the realm of partisan politics, and the insistence on
higher standards of judicial qualifications and conduct. The ideals
of our profession should be the fixed stars which guide our conduct. They should be the goals for which we should constantly
strive.
In his eulogy of Mr. Justice Story, Mr. Webster said:
Justice, sir, is the greatest interest of man on earth.
It is the ligament which holds civilized beings and civilized nations together. Wherever her temple stands, and so
long as it is duly honored, there is a foundation for social
security, general happiness, and the improvement and
progress of our race.
The task of the judge and the lawyer is to accomplish the administration of justice fairly, competently, speedily, impartially,
and equally under law. By earnestly striving to measure up to
our ideals, by improving our stated standards of conduct and of
competency and by the insistance of the organized Bar and the
individual judge and lawyer that those standards shall be maintained, we can and will discharge our duty to the public to bring
about that constant improvement in the administration of justice
which must be our never ending endeavor.
The law is a profession and not a trade. It ought to signify
for its followers a mental and moral setting apart from the multitude-a priesthood of justice.
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MASTER'S LIABILITY FOR THE TORT OF
HIS SERVANT'S ASSISTANT *
JOHN S. PFEIFFER
Student, University of Denver College of Law

During the 1951-52 term, the Supreme Court of Colorado
handed down two decisions-Whiteside v. Harvey 1 and Cooley v.
Eskridge 2 -which are inconsistent.
In the Whiteside case, the master instructed his servant to
drive the master's truck from Denver to Greeley. The servant took
his father along. The servant turned the truck over to his father.
Such act was against the express will of his employer. The son
then fell asleep. In Brighton, the father negligently crashed the
truck through plaintiff's plate glass window. The plaintiff brought
an action against the master for the damage done. The supreme
court, speaking through Justice Holland, affirmed a judgment for
the plaintiff.
In the Cooley case, the master engaged plaintiff to do certain
grading and filling in accordance with certain specifications.
Plaintiff's men and equipment were utilized in the work. The
master's servant was instructed to see that specifications were
met and to act as time-keeper. The assistant, an employee of an
independent contractor, was also engaged in the work. Plaintiff
at one time told the servant he wished to complete the work and
asked if the servant would work over-time. There was a conflict of the testimony upon the matter of who (or whom?) was to
pay the servant for such over-time--the master or the plaintiff.
One morning plaintiff's men did not show up for work. The servant tried to contact plaintiff, but could not reach him. The servant
asked the assistant to take plaintiff's tractor up a steep hill, so
that it would be ready to go when the men came to work. The
servant went along with the assistant. Because of the assistant's
negligence, the tractor rolled down the hill and was damaged. The
plaintiff brought an action against the master for the damage
done. The supreme court, speaking through Justice Alter, reversed the judgment below and instructed the trial court to enter
judgment for the master.
The principle involved in these cases is that of the master's
liability for the tort of his servant's assistant. It might be wise
to discuss, first, the origin of the master's liability for the tort
of his servant.
Let us take a common illustration: The driver of a grocer's
truck negligently runs over another in the street, the person in* It is not the province of this note to deal with the servant's implied
authority to seek an assistant in cases of emergency or necessity.
1124 Colo. 561, 239 P. 2d 989 (1951).
........ Colo .......... 241 P. 2d 851, 1951-52 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 12. p. 173 (1952).
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jured being without fault. The grocer is liable for the negligence
of his servant, the driver. But why, or upon what principle? It
is sometimes said that the reason for the master's liability in such
cases is his negligence in employing and unskillful servant. If
this were really the true reason, the logical result would be that,
if the master was guilty of no negligence in employing the servant,
he would not be liable. We know, however, that it is no defense
that the master used the greatest care in employing his servant.
Again, suppose an engineer or servant of a railroad company
wilfully ran a train of cars over another person, we know that the
company is liable for the wrongful act of its servant, and it is no
excuse for the company to say it did not authorize the act, or that
it was done without the knowledge or consent of the company, or
against its express will or order.
It is difficult to understand this principle of liability, unless
we approach it from the side of history. It is, in reality, a survival
of the ancient doctrine that the master or owner was liable for the
act of his slave, and for injuries committed by animals in his
possession. The ancient idea was that the family of the master, including his slaves, his animals, and all other property, was a unit,
that the personality of the master affected all of his property, and
that, as he was entitled to all the benefits of ownership, he must
accept the consequences flowing from injuries caused by his
property. He might buy off the vengeance of the injured person,
or he might appease it by surrendering the offending property to
the person aggrieved.
In ancient times the masses were slaves; in modern times
the masses are freemen. When slaves became freemen, the master
was shorn of his power to surrender the delinquent, but he still
continues to be liable for the acts of his servant done in the line
of the employment. It may be said that, as the master has ceased
to have any property in his servants, and as he is shorn of his
power to surrender a delinquent, the reason for the rule fails.
This then would result in exonerating the master from all liability
in all such cases
It is true that the power of surrendering the delinquent has
ceased, but it is not true that the personality of the master has
ceased to affect his servants. The will of the master dominates any
given enterprise. He calls to his aid servants and appliances. The
servant surrenders his time, and in a measure permits the will
of the master to dominate and control his actions. He is the instrument of his master in accomplishing certain ends. The servant
is placed in the position and given the opportunity to commit the
wrong by the will of the master.
Anciently, the liability of the master was not limited by the
duties imposed upon his slave. When a servant became a freeman,
he was no longer a member of the master's family, and he could
not properly be said to be the representative of his master, except
in the line of the employment. There is still substantial and just
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grounds for the principle that the master is liable for the wrongful
acts of his servant.
The principle of the master's liability for the tort of his servant's assistant seems to have extended the doctrine of master and
servant. But such a principle is still limited to the acts done within
the scope of the servant's employment and in the furtherance
of the master's business.
In the "truck" case, the court said:3
The responsibility of the owner for the driver's negligence has been affirmed times without number. Had this
accident occurred through the carelessness or negligence of
the son, the employee driver, under the undisputed facts,
as here, liability of the owner of the truck could not successfully be disputed. When this employee driver, without being
confronted with any kind of an emergency, turned over
the operation of the truck to his father, and remained in
the presence of his father while he was driving, the acts
of father became the acts of the employee for which the
employer is liable. The father, as driver, here became
an instrumentality in the hands of his son, and, further,
the truck here involved was on a mission in furtherance
of defendant's business.
Although Justice Holland mentions that the employee was
negligent in letting his father drive the truck, he bases his decision on the master's liability for the tort of his servant's assistant. For he further states that the " . . . defendant's liability
will here rest upon the negligence of the father imputed to the
careless and negligent son ... -4
In the "tractor" case, the court went upon the theory that the
defendant is only liable for the acts of his servant and his servant
only while in the scope of his employment. Therefore, it must be
shown that the servant had the express or implied authority to
hire the assistant and that the act of the assistant
was within the
scope of his employment. Justice Alter said.5
The burden of proof was on plaintiff to establish
...that [the servant] had express or implied authority
to employ [the assistant] before any liability whatsoever
could be attached to [the master] as a result of [the
assistant's] negligence. In the absence of express or implied authority, [the servant] could not create the relationship of master and servant-between [the master] and
[the assistant] so as to make [the master] liable to
plaintiff for damages resulting from [the assistant's]
negligence.
Whiteside v. Harvey, supra. p. 564.
ibid,. p. 564-65.
Cooley v. Eskridge, .supra. p. 854.
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The court then went on to say that express authority did not
exist, nor was there a ratification of the act by the master. The
court answered the remaining problem of implied authority to
hire the assistant by saying "in no event will the agent be deemed
by implication to possess powers that the principal could not himself exercise if he were acting personally."'6 Climbing on the tractor
"amounted to a wilful trespass and [was] unlawful; and ... [the
master] is not liable therefor in the absence of express authorization ' 7 for the master himself could not lawfully do such an act.
The court, in conclusion, said

:"

[The servant's] actions . . . arose by reason of his
arrangement with plaintiff for the payment of his overtime wages or as the result of a trespass and an unlawful act. If the former, [the master] is not liable therefor; if the latter, it having been done without [the master's] express authority and not within the scope of his
employment, the same result obtains.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE

An English case, Booth v. Mister,9 probably inaugurated the
doctrine. In that case a servant of the master, named Usher, whose
duty it was to have charge of the cart, was riding in the cart
at the time when the accident occurred, but another person, who
was not in the master's service, was driving the cart, Usher having given him the reins. Lord Abinger, C. B., in holding the
master liable said :10
As the defendant's servant was in the cart, I think
that the reins being held by another man, makes no difference. It was the same as if the servant had held them
himself.
In a New York case, Althorf v. Wolfe," the master set his
servant to shoveling snow and ice off from the roof of his house
along the street. The servant procured another person to assist
him, and while they were thus engaged, they threw ice upon a
passer-by and killed him. It did not appear whether the servant or
the assistant threw the ice that produced the injury, and the court
held that it was a matter of no importance, as the master would be
liable in either event. In the court's opinion, Wright, J. said :12
It is not absolutely necessary that the technical relation of master and servant, as between the defendant
'ibid. p. 856 citing 2 C.J.S., Sec. 99(a), p. 1227.
'ibid. p. 857.
'ibid. p. 857.
'7 C & P 66, 173 Eng. Rep. 30 (1835).
10ibid. p. 30.
"22 N. Y. 355 (1860).
"ibid. p. 364.
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and [the assistant] should exist, or that [the assistant]
should be able to recover of the defendant for his services,
to make the defendant liable to a third person. If the
injury was the result, substantially, of the negligent act
of [the servant], in the course of his employment in clearing the roof, or if [the assistant] was allowed to be on
the premises by the owner, shoveling snow from the roof
in so negligent a way that a person in the street is injured, or if the defendant had not taken due and proper
care to prevent a negligent or improper person from being about his premises, and in consequence of this an injury happened to a third person, he is liable.
In a concurring opinion, Denio, J. had the following to say
If we keep in mind that the defendant is responsible
for the acts of [the servant], and that [the servant] enabled the [assistant] to do the mischief, it is difficult to
discover any principle which will shield the defendant
from responsibility. It is not necessary to consider [the
assistant] as the defendant's servant. He was, rather,
the instrument by which [the servant], for whose conduct the defendant was undeniably responsible, did the
wrong.

:13

The above two cases gave rise to the doctrine of the master's
liability for the tort of his servant's assistant. Over a span of
100 years the courts have adopted one of three explanations for
holding the master liable. For the purposes of this note, they are
as follows: (1) the servant is negligent in not controlling the assistant, (2) The assistant is the alter-ego of the servant, and (3)
.The assistant is an instrumentality in the hands of the servant.
The Servant Is Negligence in Not Controlling the Assistant
In a California case, 14 the servant frequently engaged the
assistant to aid him in sending and receiving messages, but the
assistant was never employed by the master. One day while the
servant was not there the assistant sent a message to the plaintiff
to send money which the assistant absconded with. Judgment was
against the master. The decision was on the grounds that the proximate cause of plaintiff's loss was the negligence of the servant. It
was part of his duty to keep any unauthorized person from using
the defendant's wires.
He failed to discharge this duty and the [master]
is equally responsible whether the placing of [the assistant] in charge was a wrongful act committed as part
of the transaction of the business, or was mere negligence. 15
'*ibid.

"Bank

p. 365-66.

of California v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 52 Calif. 280 (1877).
"ibid. p. 291-92.
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In Thyssen v. Davenport Ice & Cold Storage Co.,16 the Iowa
court said in a dictum:
. . . the one safe and logical ground upon which to
rest the liability of a master for the negligence of a volunteer assistant of his servant is the negligence of the
servant in inviting or permitting a stranger to perform,
or assist in the performance of, the work which was intrusted to his own hand. Where such negligence is shown
with injury proximately resulting therefrom to a third
person, who is himself without fault, the master is liable
under the familiar rule which imputes to him the negligence of the employee in the course of his employment.
In Englehart v. Farrant,7 the master instructed his servants
X and Y (a boy of 17) to go in a wagon and deliver packages. X
was instructed to drive and not to leave the cart unattended. X left
the cart to get oil for his lamp. Y drove the wagon to plaintiff's
injury. The court held that it was negligent for X to leave the
cart as it was forseeable that Y should drive it to the injury
of plaintiff and that this was the proximate cause of the injury.
In Copp v. Paradis,i" the master's truck-driver, Tancread,
while engaged in his master's business, permitted a friend, Carpenter, to ride with him and drive the truck, without the authority
of the master. Due to the negligence of Carpanter, who was a
competent driver, the truck struck the plaintiff's car and injured
him. The Maine Court held that Carpenter, although negligent,
was not the servant of the master and that Tancread was not
.negligent, or if he were his negligence was not the proximate cause
of the accident.
The Tennessee Court,19 reasoned as follows:
• . . should the jury find that young Potter's death
was due to the negligent operation of the truck, that
Potter was not guilty of contributory negligence, and
that [the servant] was guilty of negligence in permitting
[the assistant] to drive the truck, then the grocery company would be liable. Or if the jury should find that [the
servant] was not guilty of negligence in permitting [the
assistant] to drive the truck, but that [the servant] was
supervising his conduct, and in so doing was guilty of
negligence, then in that event the grocery company would
be liable. [Italics added.]
In Gates v. Daley. 20 the master was the owner of a truck and
16134 Iowa 749, 112 N. W. 177, 178 (1907).
171 Q. B. 240 (1897).
Is 130 Me. 464, 157 Atl. 228 (1931).
19Potter v. Golden Rule Grocery Co., 169 Tenn. 240, 84 S. W. 2d 364, 366
(1935) see Conway v. Pickering, 111 N. J. L. 15, 166 Atl. 76 (1933).
"054 Calif. A. 654, 202 P. 467 (1921), see Johnson v. Steele, 154 Or. 137, 59
P. 2d 237 (1936) and Keen v. Clarkson, 56 Ari. 437, 108 P. 2d 573 (1940).
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had employed the servant to drive it. In the regular course of his
employment, the servant, accompanied by his wife, went on a long
trip in the vehicle. At a point on the journey the servant became
fatigued, and, in order temporarily to rest himself, allowed his
wife to operate the truck. While she was at the wheel, an accident
occurred in which the plaintiff was hurt. The court, in awarding
judgment for the plaintiff, said that the servant had no authority
from the master to engage a substitute or assistant to drive the
truck, but that his wife's negligence was imputed to him, and
from him to the master.
In a Wisconsin case, 2 the servant was a ticket agent of the
master. The servant's brother, while acting as agent, struck plaintiff. It was said that as the person who did the injury was in the
ticket office performing the duties of ticket agent with the consent
and under the direction of the person employed in that capacity,
his act must be regarded as an act of the master's servant.
Although it appears that the servant must be present at the
time of the act, some courts have gone further. In Emison v.
Wylam Ice Cream Co.,2- the Alabama court said:
...
when the servant has been intrusted with an instrumentality which he is instructed to use in the prosecution of the master's business, we think it is sound, both
in principle and in policy, to hold the master responsible
for the servant's injurious use of that instrumentality
in the performance of his authorized service, even though
the servant has intrusted the particular service to the
hands of a third person, who was acting for him and
under his direction; and, in such a case, we can recognize no valid distinction between a case where the servant
was present with his assistant at the time and place of
the accident and a case where the servant was elsewhere.
In each case the servant uses the instrumentality for the
purpose intended and authorized, and in each case the
directed act of the assistant is equally the act of the
servant.

The Assistant in an Instrumentality in the Hands of the Servant
In Hill v. Sheehan,2 3 the master instructed his servant to take
two horses to a certain place. The servant sought help from the
assistant, against the express will of the master. The assistant's
negligence in handling the horse caused plaintiff's injury. The
court in holding the master liable said :24
It is insisted that [the assistant] was in no sense
defendant's servant, and consequently he cannot be made
Fisk v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 68 Wisc. 469, 32 N. W. 527 (1887).
215 Ala. 504, 111 So. 216, 218 (1927).
'20 N. Y. S. 529 (1892), see Compbell v. Tremble, 75 Tex. 270, 12 S. W.
863 (1889).
.-'ibid. p. 530.

May, 1953

DICTA

liable for his acts. This over-looks the fact that by the
act of the servant who was in charge, an instrument i.e.
[the assistant], was used for the prosecution of the master's business, and that such instrument inflicted the injury. It is not essential, under such circumstances, that the
relation of master and servant should exist, in order to
fasten responsibility. It is sufficient when it appears that
the master's business is being prosecuted by the instrument used.
In Bluminfeld v. Meyer-Schmid Grocer Co.,"5 the Missouri
court said:
The courts have frequently placed the liability of the
the master upon the ground that a stranger, to whom
the servant has.delegated his duties, is a mere instrumentality by which the servant performs such duties, and
that therefore the stranger's negligence is that of the
servant. This doctrine appears to be sound enough when
applied to a case where the servant does not delegate his
duties in the entirety, but remains present and the duties
performed by the stranger are preformed under the eye
and the immediate supervision of the servant ...
COURTS AND CASES THAT REFUSE TO APPLY THE DOCTRINE

In Butler v. Mechanic's Iron Foundry' Co., 26 the servant allowed his assistant to ride on the truck and drive it in violation
of the master's instructions. The assistant drove on the wrong
side of the road and in consequence thereof collided with the plaintiff's car. Judgment was for the master. The court, in essence,
said that the servant could not delegate his duties, and, therefore,
his permission to his assistant to ride on the truck and drive it, was
without the scope of his authority.
In Haluptozk v. Great Northern Ry., 27 the court said:
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a master,
however careful in the selection of his servants, is responsible to strangers for their negligence committed in the
course of their employment. The doctrine is at best somewhat severe, and, if a man is to be held liable for the acts
of his servants, he certainly should have the exclusive
right to determine who they shall be. Hence, we think,
in every well-considered case where a person has been
held liable, under the doctrine referred to, for the negligence of another, that other was engaged in his service
either by the defendant personally, or by others by his
authority, express or implied.
206 Mo. A. 509, 203 S. W. 132, 137 (1921).
-'259 Mass. 560, 156 N. E. 720 (1927).
Minn. 446, 57 N. W. 144, 145 (1893), but see Geiss v. Twin City Taxicab
Co., 120 Minn. 368, 139 N. W. 611 (1913).
2755
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In Long v. Richmond, 28 the New York court said:
We conceive of no rule of law or of equity which will
permit a servant, in violation of his master's instruction
and without his knowledge or consent, to allow other
persons to do his work which he is employed to do, without any necessity therefor, and thus make the master
liable for the negligent acts of such other persons.
COLORADO CASES

In the "truck" case, the facts state that the defendant expressly told his servant not to let any other person drive the truck.
The facts also state that the son fell asleep and was not actually
directing or controlling the father. Therefore, in essence, the
supreme court has extended the rule to the point that the master
is liable for all acts of the servant's assistant committed while in
the servant's scope of employment, and the mere fact that the
master instructs the servant not to seek help or the servant leaves
the scene is not enough to take such without the scope of his employment.
In the "tractor" case, the supreme court refused to base
their decision upon the doctrine laid down in the "truck" case, but
discussed the problem of whether the servant had the implied
authority to hire the assistant for the master and, therefore, make
the assistant a servant of the master. It is submitted that the facts
would fall under the above doctrine much more readily than the
facts of the "truck" case.
Assuming that the servant was such of the master, 29 the
servant engaged an assistant to drive the tractor to the top of a
hill. The servant walked to the top of the hill along side the
tractor. The servant started to get the tractor ready for work
when the mishap occurred. At all times the servant was instructing the assistant and was the guiding hand of the assistant. The
master had not expressly told the servant not to seek assistance.
Therefore, all the requirements for the above doctrine are met
except for one. Was the assistant acting within the scope of the
servant's employment at the time of the mishap? The supreme
court said no, for both the assistant and the servant were committing a wilful trespass and an unlawful act, which takes them
out of the scope of the servant's employment.
Justice Alter cites as his authority Sager v. Nuckolls.30 In
68 N. Y. App. Div. 466, 73 N. Y. S. 912, Aff. 175 N. Y. 495. It might be of
interest to point out that New York cases will fit into all categories of this
note. See Althorf v. Wolfe, supra. Simons, v. Monier, 29 Barb. 417 (1859),
William v. Miner, 19 Misc. 644, 44 N. Y. S. 417 (1897) and Hill v. Sheehan,
supra.
"The problem as to whether the servant was such of the defendant or of the
plaintiff will not be discussed as it would be purely a jury question.
"Colo. A. 95, 32 P. 187 (1893), see Denver & Rio Grande Railroad v. Ryan,
17 Colo. 98, 28 P. 79 (1891), and Denver Omnibus & Cab Co. v. Mills, 21 Colo.
A. 582, 122 P. 798 (1912).
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that case a wife brought an action against the master for the
wrongful death of her husband caused by the servant. The servant
"way-laid" the victim and shot him to death. The court asked
the question, Was this act "in the line of [the servant's] duty and
in the furtherance of the master's business?"31 The court ruled as
a matter of law that the servant was not within the scope of his
employment, but was on a frolic of his own and that the malice
was all his and not that of the master. It is submitted that there
is a difference between- the "unlawful" act of murder, and the "unlawful" act of trespass, if it is such. If all "unlawful" acts take
the servant out of the scope of his employment, the master would
never be liable for the tort of his servant if such tort was committed
while speeding, driving carelessly, running a stop-light, or cutting
the wrong trees. Is not running through a plate glass window a
trespass and an "unlawful" act? Suppose the father in the "truck"
case did not have a chauffeur's license, would this relieve the
master of liability? The act of letting the father drive under those
circumstances was something that the master could not lawfully do.
The two cases are inconsistent.
CONCLUSION

The doctrine of the master's liability for the tort of his
servant's assistant does not extend the already severe rule of the
master's liability for the tort of the servant. It is still limited to
the worn out maxim: The master is liable for the torts committed
within the scope of the servant's employment. The acts by the
servant of seeking assistance, going against the express will of the
master, committing unlawful acts and many others are only facts
for the jury to consider in deciding whether the servant was
within the scope of his employment. If an assistant is selected by
a servant to do an act within the scope of the servant's employment
and in the furtherance of the master's business and while such
assistant is doing such, commits a tort, the master is liable whether
you label it the servant is negligent in not controlling the assistant; or the assistant is the alter-ego of the servant; or the assistant
is an instrumentality in the hands of the servant.
TAX NOTE FOR LAWYERS
In a decision handed down on April.14, 1953, the U. S. Circuit
Court of Appeals for the second circuit held that an attorney may
deduct the expenses of a postgraduate law course for federal income tax purposes. The test case was taken to the court of appeals
by George C. Coughlin of Binghampton, New York, who incurred
$305 of expenses in attending a tax course at New York University
in 1946. The New York State Bar Association and the American
Medical Association intervened in the case as amicis curiae.
.ibid. p. 103.
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LIABILITY OF JOINT TORTFEASORS
IN COLORADO
GERALDINE KEYES and EDWARD L. TRUE*

Joint liability for injuries caused by tortious act is imposed
in several distinguishable situations which can be, for convenience,
divided into three basic categories. The first and most obvious is
the situation wherein two or more persons cooperate and act in
concert in the actaal doing of the tortious act. Here the liability
is joint because the act is joint. The second general category includes cases where two or more persons, acting independently,
commit separate tortious acts and an injury is inflicted upon a
third person as a result of the combined acts. Here joint liability
is imposed because each wrongdoer has contributed to the injury.
The fact that the actors were not equally culpable or that their
independent acts contributed in varying degree to the total injury
is not considered by the courts. They are each liable for the total
damage ensuing as each contributed to the injury, and as between
wrongdoer and injured party, the wrongdoer is at fault. The third
category, although not strictly involving joint tortfeasors, still
results in joint liability to the person injured. This is what is
commonly designated vicarious liability, or the liability of both
master and servant for the tortious act of the servant. In this
case the joint liability is imposed as a matter of justice to insure
compensation to the injured party. We mention this last category
only to point out a further method by which joint tort liability is
imposed. Rules as to contribution, indemnity, release, and satisfaction applicable to vicarious joint liability would not apply to
cases intended to be here covered. We therefore only mention this
form of joint tort liability in passing.
Colorado has recognized all three of these categories and has
imposed joint and several liability in each of them. In the case
of Reyher v. Mayne,1 the defendants trespassed upon land to hunt.
Coming upon the plaintiff's live decoys the defendants shot same,
and in the process, wounded the plaintiff. There, even though it
was contended by the one defendant that the shot injuring the
plaintiff was fired by the other defendant, the court said, "It is the
fact of participation, not the degree, or the extent, or the particulars, that makes every participant in such a tort liable. It is a
thing integral and indivisible. Each defendant here is properly
answerable for the sum of the damage inflicted by both wrongdoers." In Larimer and Weld Irrigation Company v. Walker, 2
two irrigation companies acting pursuant to an agreement for the
sharing of water, transferred, by the separate act of each, an ex* Students, College of Law, University of Denver.
190 Colo. 586, 10 P. 2d 1109 (1932).
-65 Colo. 320, 176 P. 282 (1918).
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cessive amount of water into a public stream which resulted in the
flooding of plaintiff's land. Even though the respective amounts
of water diverted by the two defendants were greatly unequal
the court held both defendants to be jointly liable for the full
amount of the damage on the grounds that each had violated a
duty owed to the plaintiff. The act of each, though done separately,
combined to become one act, the joint act of both.
In Alden v. Watson,3 the court held that the concurring negligence of two automobile drivers resulting in the injury of the
plaintiff, even though such acts were independent and the exact
proximate cause of the accident was not determined, made defendants jointly liable for the total harm caused thereby.
LIAILITY IS JOINT AND SEVERAL

Although there is not an abundance of Colorado cases involving joint tortfeasors, nor is there any statutory law regarding this
matter, it would seem from the limited cases that the Colorado
Supreme Court follows the common law rule that the liability of
joint tortfeasors, acting either in concert or independently, is
joint and several.
The early case of Carper v. Risdon 4 refused to repudiate
liability of tortfeasors even after dismissal as against some. This
was an action for an alleged conversion of mining machinery by
a former lessee against both the land owner and a subsequent
lessee. The court, in dismissing the action against the innocent
lessee, stated as follows:
The point is made that after the court had ordered
the dismissal as to Lindemann (lessee), it could not lawfully render judgment against Carper, because the complaint charged a joint conversion. For a joint trespass,
the liability is joint and several. This action might have
been brought in the first instance against Carper alone;
there might at any time before judgment, have been a
dismissal by the plaintiff as to Lindemann, leaving the
action to proceed against the other defendant; and, on
principle, we confess ourselves unable to see why the
court might not do what could have been done by the
plaintiff, or why it is not competent to either court or
jury, in an action for a trespass, to find one defendant
guilty and another not guilty.
Shortly after this decision, in
fendants for the loss of a trunk and
a verdict against one defendant and
held that a plaintiff is entitled to

an action against several deits contents, 5 the jury returned
acquitted two others, the court
a judgment against those de-

'106 Colo. 103, 102 P. 2d 479 (1940).
419 Colo. App. 530. 76 P. 744 (1904).
'Denver Omnibus and Cab Co -. Gast, 54 Colo. 17, 129 P. 233 (1912).
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fendants found guilty even though some of the defendants are
acquitted.
In an action in trespass for conversion of mining ore,6 where
the plaintiff chose to sue only one of the converters and not the
original trespasser, the court held that acts of conversion that are
ex delicto are joint and several and that the plaintiff was not required to join all tortfeasors in a single action. The court quoted
approvingly both Carper v. Risdon and Denver Omnibus and Cab
Company v. Gast, supra, as authority for this proposition. Still
further emphasis on this point was made in an action for malicious
prosecution, 7 where the court, in dismissing an action against one
defendant, said: "In an action for damages for malicious prosecution, the liability of joint tortfeasors is joint and several, and the
judgment may be against one, more, or all of them."
A partner's liability for the tortious acts of another partner,
even prior to the adoption of the Uniform Partnership Act by
Colorado in 1931, was joint and several. Even when partners are
sued jointly for the death of a mining employee, and one partner
dies before judgment, the action is not abated, and the case can
proceed to judgment against the surviving partner." In Bonfils v.
Hayes 9 the defendants contended they were operating as a corporation even though the charter had not been renewed. When this
contention was overruled, they maintained they were not a partnership and could not be held personally liable for the negligent
tort of the defendant's agent. The court in ignoring this defense, stated:
If they were actively co-operating in a business enterprise and, in connection therewith, committed the tort
in question, they are liable whatever the title of their
combination, partners, co-adventurers, joint tort-feasors
or what.
The Uniform Partnership Act 10 makes the partnership jointly
and severally liable:
Where, by any wrongful act or omission of any partner acting in the ordinary course of the business of the
partnership or with the authority of his co-partners,
loss or injury is caused to any person, not being a partner in the partnership, or any penalty is incurred, the
partnership is liable therefor to the same extent as the
partner so acting or omitting to act.
The act further provides" that a partnership is bound to
make good any breach of trust:
OAmerican

Smelting and Refining Co. v. Hicks, 65 Colo. 146, 172 P. 1055

(1918).
'Bernstein

v. Simon, 77 Colt. 193, 235 P. 375 (1925).

'Rice v. Van Why, 49 Colo. 7, 111 P. 599 (1910).
70 Colo. 340, 201 P. 677 (1921).
"C. S. A., Ch. 123, Sec. 13 (1935).
C. S. A., Ch. 123, Sec. 14 (1935).
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(a) Where one partner acting within the scope of
his apparent authority receives money or property of a
third person and misapplies it; and (b) Where the partnership in the course of its business receives money or
property of a third person and the money or property so
received is misapplied by any partner while it is in the
custody of the partnership.
Liability of railroad companies using common tracks, for
injuries caused by reason of faulty maintenance of such tracks
was recognized early in Colorado history in the case of Denver and
Rio Grande Railroad Company v. Sullivan.1 2 Plaintiff was injured
as a result of a derailment of defendant lessee's car. In holding
both roads jointly and severally liable, the court made the following
statement:
Where one company owns a line of railroad and another company is permitted to use a part of the line, the
same duty devolves upon each to see that the road over
which it runs is safe and in good repair. Both companies
are liable for injury resulting from the negligent condition of the track. The liability is joint against both
companies, or single against either.
This rule of law has been followed whenever an analagous
situation has arisen. Where an explosion resulting in death occurred in a freight yard due to the negligence of the lessee of the
railroad tracks, both the owner of 13
the tracks and the lessee were
joined in one action and held liable.
Negligence ordinarily imposes joint liability where there is
a common neglect of a common duty owed either to individual
third persons or to the general public. The failure of both an adjoining lot owner and the city to cover a sidewalk excavation is an
obligation common to both and makes it possible for them to be
sued jointly or severally. 14 Employment of two physicians for
diagnosis and treatment which is performed negligently makes
them liable as joint tortfeasors. 15
At common law permissive joinder of defendants was limited
to cases of concerted action on the theory that the plaintiff had only
one cause of action and could recover only one judgment. Colorado
has consistently refused to follow this doctrine both before and
after the adoption of the liberal joinder provisions of the Colo-

21 Colo. 302, 41 P. 501 (1895).
"Willson v. Colorado & Southern Railway Co. et al., 57 Colo. 303, 142 P.
174 (1914).
1' Elliott et al. v. Field, 21 Colo. 378, 41 P. 504 (1895);
Goede v. City of
Colorado Springs et al. 200 F. 99 (1912); Belcaro Realty Investment Company
et al. v. Norton, 103 Colo. 485, 87 P. (2d) 1114 (1939).
5 Bolles v. Kinton et al., 83 Colo. 147, 263 P. 26 (1928).
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rado Rules of Civil Procedure. This, of course, does not preclude
the plaintiff from suing joint tortfeasors severally.
RELEASE OF JOINT TORTFEASORS

A release is a surrender of a cause of action and does not
necessarily indicate that satisfaction of the claim through full
compensation for the injury has been received. Since at common
law releases were under seal, a release to one of two tortfeasors
that had acted in concert necessarily released the other, as there
was only one cause of action to be surrendered. American courts
have divided on this point. Colorado follows the common law rule
in holding that a release of a right of action against one tortfeasor releases the other. 16 This is true even though the release
itself indicated an intention not to release all of the joint tortfeasors.1 7 It would seem from the decisions of the Colorado Supreme Court that joint tortfeasors are liable both jointly and
severally and a release of one is a release of all.
LIABILITY AS BETWEEN JOINT TORTFEASORS

Historically contribution between joint tortfeasors has been
denied. Thus where a judgment has been recovered against two
wrongdoers jointly and only one actually satisfies the judgment,
he is left with no remedy against his fellow judgment debtor. That
one of two equally culpable parties should bear the entire loss
caused by the joint wrongful act while the other wrongdoer goes
free, so to speak, seems unjust and inequitable. The reason for the
rule seems to be that public policy will not allow the wrongdoer
who has responded in damages to ground an action upon his own
iniquity. In some jurisdictions there has been a distinction drawn
between the cases in which malice was involved and those involving only negligence, allowing contribution in the latter case but
denying it in the former. Several states have by statute allowed
recovery by one tortfeasor over against his fellow wrongdoer
in limited cases. Some seven states and Hawaii have adopted the
Uniform Contribution Among Tostfeasoss Act which completely
abrogates the common law rule denying contribution between joint
tortfeasors.
The authors were unable to find any case in Colorado directly
bearing upon the point of contribution between tortfeasors, nor
was any statutory enactment in Colorado found on the subject.
There is dictum in the case of Otis Elevator Company v. Maryland
Casualty Company 18 to the effect that where the joint tortfeasors
acted in concert contribution will be denied. As this is merely
dictum, and as no Colorado case has arisen where contribution
was actually denied, the question is to a great extent an open one
in this state. Just where the Colorado Supreme Court will draw
10Bowmanv. Davis, 13 Colo. 297, 22 P. 507 (1889); Denver & Rio Grande
R. Co. v. Sullivan, supra.
Ducey v. Patterson, 37 Colo. 216, 86 P. 109 (1906).
95 Colo. 99, 33 P. 2d 974 (1934).
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the line is only subject to conjecture. The rather liberal rule
adopted in the cases of indemnity of one tortfeasor by his fellow
wrongdoer, to be discussed later, may indicate that contribution
in Colorado might be allowed except in the cases of actual malice
or concerted action.
Indemnity of one joint tortfeasor from his joint wrongdoer
has been allowed in Colorado. In Colorado & Southern Railway
Company v. Western Light & Power Company,19 the court recognized the general rule that there can be no contribution or indemnity between joint tortfeasors but held that the case fell within
a well recognized exception to the rule where "the plaintiff's
negligence was antecedent, negative and passive, merely producing the occasion or condition, and did not contribute to the accident, and that the defendant's negligence, of a different character,
if not willful, was subsequent, active and positive, and the sole
cause of the collision." The wrongdoer whose negligence was the
actual cause of the injury, as between the two wrongdoers, is
primarily liable and must indemnify his fellow wrongdoer for
damages paid as a result of the injury done by such negligence.
In the case of Otis Elevator Company v. Maryland Casualty
Company,2' 0 where the elevator company's negligence consisted of
improper installation of the elevator cables and the Oil Exchange
Building Company's negligence consisted merely of failure to inspect such cables, indemnity was allowed not only to the extent
of monies paid in damages but also for expenses of defending
suits against injured third parties. The court said, "Oil Exchange
Building had the right to recover from Otis Company for its negligence as the primary cause of the accident." (Italics ours.)
In the case of Parrish v. De Remer,21 the Colorado Supreme
Court clearly stated a summarization of the above discussed two
cases. Speaking of the decision in Colorado & Southern Railway
Company v. Maryland Casualty Company, which was followed
by the Otis Elevator Company case, the court said:
In this decision the general principles announced
are: 1. That while there is a general rule which precludes
one wrongdoer from receiving indemnity from another
wrongdoer, there is an exception thereto which permits
a party who is in fault as to the person injured, but who
is without fault as to the party whose actual negligence
is the cause of the injury, to recover indemnity. 2. Where
an action is brought and both defendants are found
guilty, one who pays the judgment may have a cause
of action against the other for indemnity because the
question as to the negligence of which the defendant was
the primary, sole and proximate cause of the injury was
"73 Colo. 107, 214 P. 30 (1923).
2095 Colo. 99, 33 P. 2d 974 (1934).
'117 Colo. 256, 187 P. (2d) 597 (1947).
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not adjudicated and will not be deemed to have been adjudicated until it appears that such issue was actually
submitted and determined in said action for damages.
3. Even though one was guilty of some negligence resulting in damages to another, in an action for which, judgment was entered, this does not preclude, bar or estop the
judgment debtor from establishing that the negligence
of another was the sole, proximate and primary cause of
the injury, and if this fact is established by a preponderance of the evidence, the one paying the judgment is entitled to indemnification. 4. One who has been charged
with negligence as to another, and for which judgment
has been entered and paid, may maintain an action against
a joint tortfeasor for indemnification if he can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the sole,
proximate and primary cause of the injury and resultant
judgment was the negligence of his joint tortfeasor. The
judgment against two joint tortfeasors is not evidence
in such an action, neither is it res judicata, a bar or
estoppel between these joint tortfeasors.
The law governing the liability of joint tortfeasors to one
another, rights of contribution or indemnity, is in a state of flux
and change in all jurisdictions. Colorado is no exception. The
total picture indicates a movement away from the common law
rule that contribution or indemnity will not be allowed between
joint tortfeasors. Some states have expressly abrogated this rule,
in part, by excepting certain situations by statute. Others have
accomplished the same result through judicial decision in recognizing exceptions to the general rule even though still espousing
that rule.
The law on these points is not clearly defined in Colorado.
The Supreme Court of this state has espoused the general rules.
They have said that contribution will be denied between joint
tortfeasors; they have said that indemnity of one joint tortfeasor
by his fellow wrongdoer will not be allowed. Yet they have not
denied contribution nor have they denied indemnity. In the case
of contribution, attorneys in the area have taken the court at their
word. The court said no contribution would be allowed, so no attorney has asked them to allow it. They said one of two joint
tortfeasors can not obtain indemnity from his fellow wrongdoer,
but when they were asked to allow such relief they found an exception to the general rule. Is it not possible, then, that when
presented with a proper case they may also find exceptions to the
general rule prohibiting contribution between joint tortfeasors?
Granting that as a matter of public policy one cannot ground his
claim on his own iniquity, could they not find that one may not
advance the culpability of another to shield his own wrongful act.
We do not know in what cases contribution will be allowed, or if
it will be allowed. We do not know when indemnity will not be
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allowed, but know only some cases in which it will be. We do not
know, therefore, we may still hope, that, unlike the common law
judges, our Supreme Court will approach the question with
an open mind oriented to the world in which we live. We
may hope that the absurd unfairness of shackling one of two
merely negligent wrongdoers with the entire financial burden of
damage caused thereby, simply because he is easier to collect
against, will not continue to exist in Colorado. We may still hope
that by approaching the problem with open eyes and minds our
Supreme Court will spare us the entanglement of one more statute.

WHEN THE SPOKEN WORD BECOMES A LIBEL
LESLIE KEHL and LORIN PARRAGUIRRE*

Due to the ease with which defamatory matter has been published since the advent of radio, television and other modern
media, the traditional distinction between libel and slander is without basis in reason and should be abolished. The existing distinction might well be compared to the living leaves on a tree whose
roots are dead. The foundation is gone, but the law founded upon
that foundation lives on. Ultimately, however, the law must perish
even as the leaves on the foundationless tree must fall.
Present day courts recognize the vanishing of the foundation,
but refuse to depart from the historical distinction between libel
and slander. The attitude of the courts is clearly expressed in a
recent federal case which stated, "The distinction between libel
and slander, although indefensible in principle, is too well recognized to be repudiated."'
To graphically show the results of the present law, consider
these practical examples. A letter containing defamatory matter
about X is sent to X but his secretary opens the letter and reads
the matter. Without proof of more X has an action against the
defamer. Suppose, however, the same matter had been published in an extemporanious television show. Then X would have
no action without proof of special damages or that the slander
was of the type actionable per se, since extemporaneous television
broadcasts were held to be slander in the only case dealing with
the point. 2 It is clear in which of the examples harm was most
likely to result, and yet it is equally clear that in many cases redress from the grievance could only be had in the less harmful case
of the letter read by a third person.
Take another example. X prepares a script in which the
Z hotel is referred to as a house of ill repute. X publishes the defamation by reading the script on a radio broadcast. Y states the
same defamation over the air but is not reading from a script at
* Students, University of Denver College of Law.
'Remington v. Bentley, 88 Fed. Sup. 166.
2 ibid.
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the time. In both cases the damage is exactly the same, but Z hotel
has an action only against the announcer reading from a script.
This is based on the courts' holding 3that publication of a writing
by the spoken word constitutes libel.
These examples show how cases arise under the present law
in which the equities of the situation are not in proper relation
with the remedy available. Such cases clearly were born due to
scientific developments in disseminating the spoken word. The
instances pointed out could not be supposed to have presented
themselves to the minds of those originating the distinction between libel and slander. It appears their distinction was promulgated to cope with the invention of the printing press and, further,
the distinction was established at a time when only the nobility
were literate and the written word was4 held in reverence. Today
these conditions have been supplanted.
It is submitted that the ultimate reason for the distinction
in the first instance was to separate defamation into categories
consistent with the defamation's potentiality of harm. To do this
a test of permanency of form or physical embodiment was conceived. At its conception, this was an adequate test and was a
valid method of determining what defamation had the greatest
tendency to harm. It is believed this test no longer serves its purpose and courts today should look at the reason behind the permanency of form test and establish a new test. This test could
very probably be based on potentiality of harm.
RECOGNITION OF POTENTIALITY OF HARM TEST

The American Law Institute recognized the desirability of
the "Potentiality of Harm' 'test in the Restatement of Torts, Sec.
568. They submitted the following definition of libel and slander:
(1)
Libel consists of the publication of defamatory
matter by written or printed words, by its embodiment
in physical form, or by any other form of communication which has the potentially harmful qualities characteristic of written or printed words.
(2)
Slander consists of the publication of defamatory matter by spoken words, transitory gestures, or by
any form of communication other than those stated in
subsection (1).
This definition if followed has the effect of placing the spoken
word in the classification of a libel if such spoken words have "the
potentially harmful qualities characteristic of written or printed
words." The tests to apply in determining these potentially harmful qualities are set out in paragraph (3) of the same section in
this manner:
'Locke v. Gibbons, 164 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 877, 299 N. Y. S. 188; Summit
Hotel Co. v. N. B. C., 336 Pa. 113, 8 A. 2d 302.
1Restatement of Torts, Sec. 568 Comment b.
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(3)
The area of dissemination, the deliberate and
premeditated character of its publication, and the persistence of the defamatory conduct are factors to be considered in determining whether a publication is libel rather.
than a slander.
Thus under these conditions the spoken word would become
a libel and be actionable per se. While the restatement is thought
of as setting out "what the law is" rather than "what the law
should be," a diligent search has revealed no case in which it has
been expressly held that the spoken word under such conditions
as are described in the Restatement is a libel. The Restatement
offers no examples on this particular point.
PRESENT CASE LAW

The cases seem to hold the present law to be that mere spoken
words alone are insufficient to constitute a libel. The doctrine of
libel has been extended to include the spoken word when such
word is read from a written document. 5 One court has gone so
far as to hold that a repetition by one who has heard a libel read
fulfills the requirement.6
The accompanying of the spoken word with pictures in
motion pictures has uniformily been held to be libel. 7 In the case of
radio broadcasts, the courts have repeatedly refused to hold that
a word heard by millions is libel in itself, and have relied on the
written script to make out a case of libel. This line of reasoning
has caused the courts to walk an imaginary tight-rope between
libel and slander by holding that words from a script are libel, but
extemporaneous interpolations are merely slander.8
Television has been treated somewhat differently than motion
pictures. In the case of defamation in an extemporanious T. V.
broadcast, the court held the defamation to be slander.9 While the
court didn't pursue the point of distinguishing T. V. from motion
pictures it is submitted that the only logical basis would seem to
be that there is no permanency of form in a broadcast which is
not filmed. If the broadcast were of a filmed show, there would
seem to be no distinction between T. V. and motion pictures since
motion pictures are in fact shown over T. V.
PROPOSED REFORMS

The rule of the Restatement of Torts as a final test for determining if the spoken word can be pleaded as a libel and thereby
be actionable per se would accomplish much in bringing an end to
the apparently inequitable results of the present law.
Locke v. Gibbons, supra, note 3.
"John Lamb's case, 9 Co. Rep. 59b.
'Brown v. Paramount-Publix Corp., 240 N. Y. App. 520, 270 N. Y. S. 544.
Supra, note 3.
'Remington v. Bentley, supra, note 1.
6
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Other reforms have been suggested by writers and even the
courts themselves. In an opinion by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania sustaining an action on a different sort of tort the court
said:
In this state our tort actions are in trespass: The
pleader need not lay his cause either in slander or in
libel, and, as defamation by radio possesses many attributes of both libel and slander, but differs from each, it
might be regarded as a distinct form of action.
Four possible reforms advacated by various sources are listed
in Prosser, Hornbook on Law of Torts, pp. 808-809.
1. To acquire in all cases proof of actual damage
as essential to the existence of a cause of action.
2. To make all defamation, oral or written, actionable without proof of damage.
3. To distinguish between major and minor defamatory imputations, having regard to all extrinsic facts,
and to make only the former actionable without proof
of damage.
4. To distinguish upon the basis of the extent of
publication. Prosser favors some combination of the last
two and believes such a combination is the most likely
to be adopted.
This article does not attempt to prophesy what reform will
be adopted or to expound on which proposed reform has the most
merit, but it is believed a reform measure is desirable. This measure should provide for correcting situations existant due to modern
disseminaters of the spoken word, but should not have the effect
of overruling all the present case law on the subject unless this
is absolutely necessary. Probably an adoption of the definition
of libel from the Restatement of Torts would correct existing inequities and yet retain a large measure of the case law on the
subject.
The field is open to Colorado courts, since no cases have been
decided on the point in this state. It is apparent, however, after
examining Colorado's statutory definition of libel that the courts
of this state would probably follow the case law of other states
already discussed in this article. The Colorado statutory definition
reads: "A libel is a malicious defamation expressed either by
printing, or by signs, or pictures, or the like . . ."1o Thus it is
apparent that any reform of the law of libel and slander in this
state must come from the legislature.
"Colorado

Statutes Anno., Ch. 48, Sec. 199 (1935).
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BAR SPONSORED BILLS BECOME LAW
Six bills sponsored by the Colorado Bar Association and
fourteen bills sponsored by the Denver Bar Association were
passed by the 39th General Assembly and signed by the Governor.
Reports submitted by C. Edgar Kettering and Ira L. Quiat, Chairmen of the Legislative Committees of the two Bar Associations
respectively, are here published. From these reports readers will
note that the State Bar Association sponsored mostly controversial
measures and the Denver Bar Association sponsored so-called
"lawyers bills" affecting property titles and the practice of law.
The two committees worked very closely in their legislative campaigns and many of the bills sponsored by the Denver Bar Association were sponsored at the request of the Board of Governors
of the State Bar Association. The report of the Denver committee
summarizes the provisions of the new laws because it is felt that
the members of the bar should be informed of these changes at
the earliest possible time.
REPORT OF COLORADO BAR LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE

The following is a report of the activities of the Legislative
Committee of the Colorado Bar Association during the session of
the 1953 General Assembly. We were requested by the Association
President, Mr. Jean S. Breitenstein, and the Board of Governors
to sponsor the following legislation:
1. A Bill for the increase of salaries of judges of courts of
record.
Many Bills for this purpose were introduced, ours being, so
far as I know, the only one wherein Supreme, District and County
Judges were combined in one Bill. We appeared before several
committee and informal hearings advocating $15,000 per year for
the Supreme court and $12,000 per year for the District court (the
County judges' salaries being graduated in proportion). Many
outside factors, forces, and the work of many individuals entered
into the ultimate passage of separate Bills increasing the Supreme
court salaries from $8500 to $12,000, the District court salaries
from $7500 to $9000, and the County court salaries on a graduating scale, with the Denver County Judge being raised from $8000
to $9500. The Bar Association, together with other organizations
and individuals took an active part with respect to this salary
legislation. I believe our efforts were particularly helpful (a) in
the general education of legislators on the subject of the necessity
for judicial salary increases, and (b) in coordinating the efforts
of the various sponsors so that such efforts were directed toward
the entire program for the benefit of all the courts of record.
2. A Bill creating a Judicial or Departmental Council giving the Supreme Court supervisory authority over inferior courts.
This Bill was sponsored by the Association and was enacted.
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3. Enabling legislation permitting certain county judges to
sit for district judges, in accordance with the recently adopted
constitutional amendment.
This Bill was passed with practically no opposition.
4. Legislation in connection with the revision of the 1953
statutes under the work of Mr. Charles Rose.
This legislation was adopted without the necessity for any
active efforts on our part.
5. Legislation sponsored by the Mental Hygiene Sub-committee relating to the adjudication and commitment proceedings
of mentally ill persons.
This Bill was defeated largely on the issue of requiring homes
for mental defectives to receive all patients committed thereto
without regard to the availability of space. Much time and effort
had been expended in the preparation and sponsoring of this Bill
by the Mental Hygiene Committee.
In addition to the foregoing proposed legislation, we interested ourselves in assisting in the enactment of a new law increasing and widening the field of payment of expenses to district and
county judges when traveling out of the counties of their residence.
This Bill was defeated on third reading in spite of the efforts of
your Committee to secure its passage.
Special acknowledgment must be given to the members of the
Committee and to the members of the legal profession who are
serving in the legislature. Their assistance was invaluable in our
activities.
C. EDGAR KETTERING,

Chairman.
REPORT OF THE DENVER BAR LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE

The Legislative Committee of the Denver Bar Association
drafted and actively sponsored in the 39th General Assembly
sixteen bills. Fifteen of the Bills were passed by both houses, one
was vetoed, and the other fourteen are now laws. We believe that
this is the best record ever established by the Denver Bas Association and will attempt to briefly summarize these new laws and
point out the changes.
SENATE BILL NO. 205-AMENDING SECTION 50, CHAPTER 176, 1935 C.S.A.-Sub-section (a) of this new law improves
the language of old Section 50 and deletes provisions which are
found elsewhere in our probate laws. For instance, Section 253
of Chapter 176 provides for the acceptance and waiver of service.
There was no need to re-enact it in this new law.
The old law "required" all persons cited to attend the "probate." In most instances there is no contest or objections to a will,
yet every interested party served with a citation was required to
attend. The Court, the Clerk and the Bailiff all had to explain to
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such persons that they did not actually have to be present unless
they opposed the will.
Under the new act the citation merely advises the interested parties of the time, date and place of the hearing of the
probate.
Sub-section (b) of the new act provides that if a person objects to a will presented for probate because he claims under another will, then such other will must be filed simultaneously with
the objections or a reason be given why it-is not filed, and the objections must set forth the reasons for the failure to file the same.
It fixes the parties to be served in case of a caveat, and, upon the
filing of such objections, all other wills in the possession of the
proponent of the will must be filed. The Court in one or more
hearings determines which of all purported wills is the will of the
decedent.
Before the passage of this new act persons claiming under
another will merely filed objections and the sole issue, was on the
will presented for probate. If that will was denied probate then
the other will would have to be presented and the same routine
gone through. Under sub-section (b) multiple hearings and trials,
where there is more than one will, are avoided and the delay of
finding out which is the true will of the decedent is eliminated.
SENATE BILL NO. 208-PROVIDING FOR THE OUTLAWING OF CONTRACTS OF PURCHASE AND SALE OF
REAL ESTATE-Section 1 of this act provides that no action or
other proceeding shall be brought or maintained under a contract for purchase and sale of real property by a person (out of
possession) after ten years, from the date fixed for the delivery
of the deed under such contract, and if no date of delivery is
specified in the contract, ten years after the date when the final installment of the purchase price was due.
Section 2 has the same provisions concerning a bond for a
deed.
Section 3, makes it clear that the act does not affect Section
116 of Chapter 40, 1935 C.S.A. (outlawing agreements in the nature of an option) and grants one year from the effective date of
the act in which to bring any action on contracts where the 10-year
period has already expired or will expire.
For years old contracts of sale and purchase shown on abstracts have plagued title lawyers and have required Quiet Title
actions to remove the cloud against real estate caused by such
contracts.
SENATE BILL NO. 210-MINING AND MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONS-Since territorial days the Directors of a
mining or manufacturing company had no power to mortgage the
company mines or plant or its principal machinery until such encumbrancing was approved by a majority of the outstanding stock
of such corporation at a special stockholders meeting. In the early
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days when fake promoters were selling spurious mining stock and
engaging in other doubtful and illegal ventures such provisions had
a salutary effect. However, those days are long past and the provision remained on our statute books. A lawyer could not safely
pass any trust deed or mortgage by any corporation because the
corporation might be engaged in some manufacturing venture,
and the statute provided that without the approval of the stockholders such mortgage was absolutely void.
In 1951 the Legislature amended this section and provided
that if all of the stockholders signed the consent to such mortgage
that no stockholders meeting need be held.
This bill repeals this antiquated provision so there is no
longer any difference between a mining or manufacturing company and other corporations.
SENATE BILL NO. 212-ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY
WEAPON NOW A FELONY-The District Attorney's office requested the Bar Association to present this bill to the Legislature.
For years the offense of an assault with a deadly weapon was a
high misdemeanor under our laws. It is now a felony.
Juries, in trying a person for an assault with intent to commit
murder, were handed a number of possible verdicts. One of these
possible verdicts was "guilty of assault with a deadly weapon."
Many juries could not agree and compromised on "assault with a
deadly weapon" in the belief that the same was a serious offense
carrying with it a penitentiary term. In many instances such
criminals escaped with minor sentences. This situation is now
remedied.
SENATE BILL NO. 215-ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF CHATTEL MORTGAGES-Under the Colorado Statutes a deed or other
instrument affecting real estate need not be acknowledged. It is
notice to the world when recorded. The acknowledgment merely
permits the instrument to be introduced in evidence without proof
of execution.
For some mysterious reason the Colorado Statutes have always required that a chattel mortgage, in order to be valid against
third parties, in addition to being recorded had to be acknowledged. Many a chattel mortgage has been held to be void even
though recorded because of some technical defect in the acknowledgment. The committee felt that this technical requirement was
arbitrary and unjust.
A chattel mortgage, even though un-acknowledged, is now
notice to everybody if of record.
SENATE BILL NO. 219-DEATH, RESIGNATION OR REMOVAL OF A FIDUCIARY-Sections 90, 91 and 92 of Chapter
176 (1935 C.S.A.) dealt with the removal and resignation of
fiduciaries. There was no express provision in the Statutes dealing with the procedure upon the death of a fiduciary.
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Under Section 90 the court had the power to remove a fiduciary for certain reasons therein specified, but the fiduciary had
to be "summoned." Why, in a proceeding already pending before
the court, it was necessary to summon a fiduciary when the court
had jurisdiction over him is beyond understanding. In many instances it was difficult to serve the summons, and in some instances the court was powerless to stop a fiduciary, especially if
he had power under the will, until he could be served and a hearing had.
Under Section 92, if a fiduciary resigned, the resignation
could not be accepted until notice of his intention to resign by
publication, was given, as in case of a final settlement. If, thereafter the resignation was accepted, was another notice required for
final settlement of the fiduciary's reports?
The new law combines all cases where a fiduciary is to be
replaced, regardless whether the vacancy be caused by death,
resignation or removal. It provides who is to make the final report, and provides for the appointment of a successor immediately.
No longer is it necessary to summon a fiduciary in case the
question of his removal is before the court. The court may upon
its own motion or upon the petition of any interested party notify
the fiduciary to appear at the time fixed, and if the notice cannot
be served personally, the notice is given in such manner as the
court may direct, and the court can then hear the matterand
remove the fiduciary.
Under Section 3 of this new law, whenever the court believes that it is for the best interests of the estate, the court may
suspend or limit the powers of any fiduciary, with or without
notice, until a hearing can be had. We believe the courts had
this inherent power before, but probate judges were hesitant to
enter an order curbing a fiduciary who was mismanaging or
wasting the assets of an estate until such fiduciary was summoned.
In a recent instance an administrator proceeded to spend substantial amounts of estate funds in a drunken spree. The court
hesitated to instruct the bank not to honor his checks. He could
not be found and before he was finally located and summoned, a
substantial part of the estate funds had been dissipated.
SENATE BILL NO. 221-REPORTS OF FIDUCIARIESThis law amends Section 217 of our probate law. There was no
provision for the destruction of vouchers in estate proceedings
regardless of the period that had passed after the estate was
closed, and the files of the County Court were cluttered with
vouchers going back to territorial days. The County Judges
wanted authority to destroy vouchers 10 years after the date of
the discharge of the fiduciary. The new law 'gives the court that
power.
When the committee studied Section 217 it found other things
that needed correcting. It simplified and improved the language.
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Under the old law the fiduciary had to file his report every six
months, but in practice very few fiduciaries did so. Under the old
law the court could dispense with a report but it was questionable
whether the court had authority to enlarge the time.
The new law empowers the court upon proper showing to
shorten or lengthen the six month period or dispense with
the necessity of filing the report.
The old law contained a peculiar provision. In all estates
where any heir, legatee or devisee was unknown, or if known,
there was no person qualified to receive the legacy or distributive
share, the fiduciary had to serve a copy of each report upon the
Attorney General. Not one lawyer in a hundred complied with this
requirement, yet it was mandatory. The new law now makes it
optional with the court. The court may, if it deems best, require
such service.
SENATE BILL NO. 267-HOMESTEADS-The 1951 Legislature attempted to increase the exempt amount of a homestead
from $2,000 to $5,000. It only amended the first section of the
homestead law to read $5,000. The other sections continued to
provide for a $2,000 exemption. The new law fixes the amount
at $5000 in all sections.
Under the old law a marginal entry had to be entered on the
margin of the instrument of the acquisition of title unless such
instruments was not of record.
With the prospect of microfilming (discussed hereafter) an
impossible situation would have been presented, because no marginal entry could be made on the microfilm record. Under the
new law, a homestead can be created by either a marginal entry
or by an instrument in writing in which the owner or his spouse
states that the property is being homesteaded.
The act re-writes and clarifies provisions of the old law.
Minor changes have cleared up ambiguities and more clearly defined certain rights.
Under the old law, if a homestead were sold and the proceeds
invested in another home, the new home was also exempt to the
extent of the homestead, and no marginal entry on the deed of the
new home was required.
Under the new law the proceeds of the homestead are exempt
for a period of one year, and if a new home is acquired it must
be homesteaded within 30 days from the recording of the deed.
At the time of the adoption of the old homestead law we did
not have joint tenancy in this state. Provisions are made to protect the rights of joint tenants and to define rights upon the
death of one joint tenant.
Upon the destruction of the homestead by any casualty the insurance proceeds are exempt in the same manner as if the homestead had been sold.
The act also improves the present provisions concerning the
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conveying or encumbrance of the homestead and provides that
when two parties of opposite sex having the same surname join
in the conveyance or encumbrance of the homestead, it is presumed that the parties signing the same are husband and wife.
HOUSE BILL NO. 345-ALLOWANCE TO WIDOWS AND
CHILDREN-Section 1 of this new law authorizes the court, after
a hearing, to permit the spouse or the minor children of the deceased owner of a home to remain in possession of the home and
the household furniture without payment of rent for such period
as the court may deem just.
Upon the death of a person the court may make reasonable
provision for the surviving spouse or the minor children from
and after the appointment of a fiduciary, and payments made are
deducted from the widow's or minors' allowance.
This permits the court, instead of waiting six months to determine the priority of claims, to enter an order for the support
of the dependents of the decedent at once.
The next paragraph of this section increases the widow's
allowance to $3500. If there be no widow, then the minor children
of the decedent are entitled to such allowance. If there be stepchildren the court no longer is compelled to give the widow and her
children one-half and the step-children the other half. Under the
old law if the widow had five children of her own and there was
only one step-child, the step-child would have received $1,000
and the widow and her children the other $1,000.
Under the new law the court divides the allowance among
the widow (if there be step-children) and the children of the
decedent in such manner as the court deems best.
Section 3 of this bill amends Section 212 and increases the
amount allowed to the spouse of a mental incompetent or the
minor children, before the payment of creditors, to the same
amount as provided for the widows' allowance.
HOUSE BILL NO. 351-AGREEMENTS TO MAKE A WILL
-The Supreme Court in a recent case reaffirmed the principle
that if two persons, at or about the same time, made wills with
similar or reciprocal provisions, that that fact alone established
an agreement to make the wills, and the wills were irrevocable.
Most lawyers felt that this principle of law was unfair and that
many similar wills were drawn by spouses without any agreement that the wills should be irrevocable.
This new law provides that the agreement to make a will
must be proved by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence, and
the fact that two or more wills were executed at or about the
same time by different persons shall not of itself be any evidence
that such wills were made in consideration of each other.
HOUSE BILL NO. 353-TAX DEEDS-Section 258 of Chapter 142 (Revenue Act), 1935 C.S.A. provided that a treasurer's
deed "when substantially thus executed and recorded shall vest in
the purchaser all right, title . . ." Lawyers in examining titles
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found a treasurer's deed of a certain date. Subsequently they
found a quit claim deed from the grantee in the treasurer's deed,
but the treasurer's deed was not recorded before the date of the
quit claim deed. Lawyers therefore turned down the title because
the grantee in the treasurer's deed was not the owner until he
had recorded his treasurer's deed.
This new act amends Section 258 and provides that upon the
execution of a treasurer's deed, regardless of the date of recording,
title vests in the grantee.
HOUSE BILL NO. 355-EXTENSION OF MORTGAGES
AND TRUST DEEDS-Section 123 of Chapter 40, 1935 C.S.A.
states that in no event can a mortgage, trust deed or other lien be extended beyond a total of 30 years by various extensions. Lawyers
had some doubt as to the meaning of the 30-year period extensions.
A new section was added which now provides that the "30
years" means 30 years from the original maturity date of the
mortgage, trust deed or other lien.
HOUSE BILL NO. 392-MICROFILM RECORDING-In
1951 the Legislature authorized microfilm recording in Denver.
The City of Denver was about to inaugurate a system of microfilming of real estate records which would have made the examination of real estate records by lawyers a difficult, tedious and
endless task.
The Legislature amended Chapter 130 of the 1951 Session
Laws and provided that real estate records could be microfilmed
but the recorder had to maintain one set of records in books which
are legible without the aid of any enlarging device.
The 1951 act provided that microfilm records were not subject to an inspection by the public, but the recorder could permit
the inspection thereof.
The new act makes the microfilm records as well as other
records open to examination by the public.
HOUSE BILL NO. 395-VALIDATING ACTS OF A FIDUCIARY UPON THE REVOCATION OF LETTERS-Under the
law, when a person was adjudged to be a mental incompetent the
court must forthwith appoint a conservator and the conservator
takes possession of the assets of the mental inconipetent. If the
mental incompetent or some other person requested a jury trial,
where did that leave the conservator if the mental incompetent
was subsequently found to be sane?
If a will were admitted to probate and the executor proceeded
to act thereunder, and thereafter a later will was discovered and
the Letters revoked, what would be the liability of the fiduciary
originally appointed?
The new law provides that any act of a fiduciary appointed
by a court shall not be invalid or void solely for the reason that
the order appointing him was annulled or revoked.
IRA L. QUIAT, Chairman.

